






Sceptical Doubts – Raising the
Standards or Changing the Angle?
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explore two different accounts of the mechanisms by which epis-
temic standards change, as a basis for the explanation of how arguments for radical scep-
ticism get their appearance of legitimacy and persuasive power. The discussion begins with 
a presentation of arguments for the view that our epistemic practice contains a mechanism 
that raises the epistemic standards, to illustrate how sceptical hypotheses pose challenges to 
the truth value of our ordinary knowledge claims. Then, the discussion moves to a critique 
aimed to show that raising the standards approach is not well-suited to the job because it 
does not truly account for the radical form of philosophical scepticism. We take that these 
arguments pose serious problems with raising the standards approach and have to be dealt 
with. We examine an alternative account of changing epistemic standards,  changing  the  
angle	of	scrutiny, in line with which epistemic standards are interpreted as conditioned by 
disciplinary fields within which we conduct our research. After that, we compare the two 
highlighted approaches based on their success in providing an adequate description of ac-
tual epistemic practice. We conclude by arguing in favour of a latter approach as a superior 
conception and also as a promissory framework for an explanation of the phenomenology 





The  epistemological  viewpoint  which  attempts  to  reconstruct  the  problem  
of	philosophical	scepticism	in	light	of	the	thesis	that	our	epistemic	practice	












prevalent:	 (a)	 that	 the	 conversational  mechanism	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 bring	
about	shifting	from	an	everyday	context	to	a	sceptical	one	(Williams	2001;	
Engel	2004;	Davis	2004;	Barke	2004;	 etc.);	 (b)	 that	 it	 is	 unclear	 in	which	














§2,	we	introduce	an	alternative	approach	– changing the angle of scrutiny –	
and	offer	a	comparative	evaluation	of	the	two	approaches.	We	argue	in	favour	
of	the	thesis	that	changing the angle of scrutiny	view	enjoys	a	certain	advan-
tage over raising the standards view. 
1. Raising the epistemic standards
We	begin	our	discussion	with	an	example	of	how,	according	to	conversational	
contextualists,	conversational	mechanisms	are	employed	in	order	to	raise	the	











the schedule that Hana saw was the local bus to Ljubljanska Street	and	not	the	bus	to	Ljublja-
na.’”	(Pavličić	2018:	37)
Given	that	confusing	the	bus	to	Ljubljana and to Ljubljanska Street had pre-
viously	happened	to	Hana’s	friend,	and	given	the	importance	of	attending	the	
meeting	in	the	morning,	the	rest	of	the	group	start	to	reflect	on	their	previous	
















stimulated into having experiential evidence that is entirely indistinguishable 






ity	with	every	part	of	our	actual	and	potential	experience.	If	we	take	p to be an 
‘ordinary’	proposition,	such	as	“I	have	hands”,	and	take	q to be an appropriate 
sceptical	hypothesis,	such	as	BIV,	the	sceptical	argument	can	be	developed	in	
the	following	way:













to the maximum by bringing up some extremely remote possibilities which 
are	overlooked	–	and	perhaps	reasonably	ignored	–	in	our	everyday	practical	
context,	but	which	in	the	absence	of	pragmatic	constraints	must	be	ruled	out	
in	 order	 for	 anything	we	 believe	 count	 as	 knowledge.	 Precisely,	when	 the	
sceptic	asserts	 the	(1)	premise	of	AI,	 they	vastly	expand	the	range	of	error	
possibilities such that q	becomes	a	relevant	possibility,	which	introduces	the	




claimed that sceptical hypotheses become epistemically relevant by making 
them explicit	(DeRose	1995),2	by	bringing	our	attention	to	them	(Lewis	1996	
1   
Conversational  contextualism  has  been  re-
butted by those who hold that alterations in the 
aforementioned	conversational	parameters	do	
not	affect	the	semantic	dimension	of	the	con-
cept	 of	 knowledge	 but	 solely	 the	 conditions	
under which it is appropriate conversationally 
to	 assert	 the	 aforementioned	 sentences	 (see:	
Brown	2006;	Bach	2005;	Davis	2004;	Davis	




but appears to be true due to its being in line 
with	 low	 standards	 for	 appropriate	 laying	
claim	 to	knowledge.	Unger	 (1971)	 famously	
defended	this	strategy.	See	also:	Stroud	1984:	
§	2.	 (2)	That	ex	post	denial	of	knowledge	 is	
false,	but	appears	 to	be	 true	due	 to	 its	being	
in	line	with	low	standards	for	appropriate	lay-
ing claim to doubt (Rysiew	2001:	492,	499).	
As	the	aforementioned	example	is	subject	 to	








discussion have done much work in philoso-
phy	of	language	and	semantics	on	the	context	
dependence	 of	 knowledge	 attributions	 and,	
in	turn,	the	debate	became	highly	susceptible	
to	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 problems	 and	 disputes.	
However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 excellent	
work aimed to show that ordinary knowledge 
ascriptions	 fail	 to	 display	 any	 sensitivity	 to	
factors	relevant	from	the	conversational	con-
textualist	 angle	 (precisely,	 stakes)	 has	 been	
done	 in	 the	field	 of	experimental	philosophy	
in:	“Nothing	at	Stake	in	Knowledge”	(Rose	et 
al.	2019).
2	   
More	precisely,	DeRose	is	of	the	opinion	that	








2003).3 Fogelin’s general claim is that once we are presented with the scepti-
cal	scenarios,	we	have	a	strong	inclination	to	dwell	on	them,	which	in	return	
invokes	 raising	 the	“level	of	scrutiny”	so	high	 that	all	 sorts	of	psychologi-
cal	or	pragmatic	constraints	are	set	aside	(Fogelin	1999:	159;	Fogelin	2003:	
108–109).	But,	whereas	 Fogelin	 claims	 that	 ordinary	 knowledge	 turns	 out	
not to be knowledge simpliciter,	but	only	knowledge for all practical goals,	





Although	 appealing	 at	 face	 value,	 the	 idea	 of	mechanisms	 for	 the	 gradual	
changing	of	epistemic	standards	generates	two	claims	which,	as	we	will	see,	

















street and not the bus to Ljubljana.
2. Remote:	Radical	anti-globalists	hacker	group	aiming	to	disrupt	the	train	
system and cause massive strikes throughout the country has intention-



























knowledge	 is	 desirable	 in	 an	 intrinsic	 or	 an	 instrumental	 sense;	whether	 it	
is	the	sole	aim	of	our	research	projects	or	there	exist	other	aims	of	equal	or	
greater	importance,	etc.
One	 point	 concerning	William’s	 previous	 remarks	 is	 worthy	 of	 emphasis.	
Note	 that	Williams	clarifies	 that,	despite	 their	 significance	 in	 terms	of	 the-
oretical	 aspirations,	 sceptical	 possibilities	 are	 certainly	 not,	 even	 remotely,	













that this argument entirely rests on appeals to intuitions.
depend  exclusively  on  pointing  to  an  error  
possibility,	but	that	the	same	effect	is	accom-
plished  by  explicitly  claiming  that  we  have  
excluded	certain	error	possibilities.	Thus,	for	
example,	 the	 context	 in	which	we	 claim	we	
are not a brain in a vat has a tendency to turn 
into a context in which the sceptic’s standards 
are at work.
3	   
For	a	neat	explanation	of	how	the	conversa-
tional  contextualist’s  and  Fogelin’s  positions  
differ,	see:	Neta	2003:	402–403.	
4   
By adhering to the thesis that the term know 
and  its  cognates  are  context-relative,	 they	
hold that sceptical worries could be resolved 
by understanding that what the sceptic has in 
mind when they talk about knowledge is per-
fectly	compatible	to	our	ordinary	knowledge	
claims	 (Cohen	 1999:	 77).	 Formulated	 like	
this,	conversational	contextualism	is	in	a	posi-
tion	to	hold	that	the	impossibility	of	legitimate	
knowledge	 ascription	 in	 the	 context	 of	 epis-
temology	does	not	imply	the	impossibility	of	
legitimate  knowledge ascription in  non-epis-
temological contexts.
5	   
Since	the	possibilities	against	which	Williams	
considers sceptical hypothesis are closer to a 
“conspiracy	theory	case”,	in	order	for	our	ar-
gument	to	apply	to	his	example	it	is	sufficient	
to	 replace	 the	 imagined	 science	 fiction	 fan	










quately addresses philosophical problems scepticism. Now we consider how 
the	notion	of	remoteness,	employed	in	terms	of	sceptical	hypotheses,	should	
be understood. 
1.2. Critical Comments on Remoteness (ii)
As	mentioned	above,	conversational	contextualists	consider	AI	as	problemat-
ic,	seeing	how	the	utterance	of	its	(1)	premise	i.e.	explicit	appeal	to	sceptical	
hypotheses leads us to the sceptical problem. Critics do not look kindly on 
this explanation. Their	general	remark	is	that,	if	the	sceptical	conclusion	only	
tells	 us	 that	we	 cannot	 fulfil	 extremely	 stringent	 standards	 for	 knowledge,	
nothing	is	intriguing	about	scepticism.	Feldman	(1999:	107;	2001:	78),	Ry-
siew	(2001:	483),	Conee	 (2005b:	66)	and	MacFarlane	 (2014:	181)	pointed	
out that the sceptical conclusion poses a challenge because the sceptic is put 










that	 I’m	not	a	BIV.	How	(and	whether)	 to	avoid	 the	bold	sceptical	 result	 is	puzzle	enough.”	
(DeRose	2017:	4)
In	light	of	the	passage	cited	above,	we	may	ask:	are	conversational	contextu-
alists in a position to explain the bold sceptical conclusion (as DeRose uses 
the	term,	see	also:	2017:	40,	100–107)	away	as	ostensible i.e. as an illusion of 





The	recent	appeal	of	conversational	contextualists	to	an error theory has ex-
actly that purpose. According to the error theory competent speakers are in 












critique	who	pointed	out	 that	 even	after	 revealing	 the	 error	 theory,	 a	great	
number	of	philosophers	continue	to	reject	it	firmly.	With	this	in	mind,	it	ap-




vincing arguments based on the illusion of invariant epistemic standards, the 
anti-sceptic	 response	 by	 conversational	 contextualists	 begs	 the	 question:	 it	






tualists have in mind interpreting sceptical hypotheses as remote. By taking 
the	theory	of	subjunctive	conditionals	as	a	basis	for	his	contextualist	account,	
DeRose	(1995:	§11–12)	claims	that	the	sceptical	world,	in	everyday	circum-
stances,	 does	 not	 belong	 to	 “the	 sphere	 of	 epistemically	 relevant	worlds”,	
for	 it	 is	 extremely	 remote	 from	 the	 actual	 world.	 This	 essentially	 means	





Cohen,	 1988:	 96–97).	 Describing	 sceptic	 hypotheses	 as	 extremely	 remote	
conversational	contextualists	hold	 that	 they	are	 irrelevant	 for	our	everyday	
attributions	of	knowledge	as	they	are	too	unrealistic:	the	likelihood	they	are	












6	   
Appeal	 of	 conversational	 contextualists	 to	
an error  theory  has  generated  a  literature  
of	 its	own	that	 is	 full	of	subtleties	and	argu-
mentative  moves  that  we  do  not  have  space  
to	discuss	here.	For	more	detail,	see:	Rysiew	
(2001).
7	   
The	format	does	not	allow	for	a	more	thorough	




in	mind.	For	 a	 convincing	 argument	 of	 how	
DeRose’s	 attempts	 to	 construct	 spheres	 of	
epistemically  relevant  worlds  based  on  their  
similarities	 with	 the	 actual	 world	 fails	 see	
(Blome-Tillmann	 2009).	 However,	 DeRose	
offers	 some	 pointers	 of	 directions	 in	 which	
his  account  could  be  improved  and  updated  
in	(DeRose	2017:	154),	admitting	the	lack	of	
precision	 in	his	use	of	 term	 the  closeness  of  













epistemic	position	(the	evidence	at	our	disposal),	alarmingly	close to our ac-
tual	world.	For	that	reason,	Williams	insists	that,	in	considering	the	sceptical	
problem,	two	notions	of	“remoteness”	must	be	clearly	distinguished:	the	first,	
which he attributes to the conversational contextualist in which we take into 
consideration	the	idea	of	factual remoteness;	and	the	second	ascribed	to	the	
sceptic,	by	which	possibilities	can	be	remote	in	terms	of	the	evidence	avail-
able	 to	 us	 –	 epistemic  remoteness.	While	 the	 conversational	 contextualists	
hold	that	the	sceptical	world	–	in	which	our	belief	in	an	ordinary	proposition	
p	is	false	–	is	factually	remote;	concerning	the	dimension	which	the	sceptic	
considers	 crucial	 for	 determining	whether	 our	 belief	 in	 ordinary	 claims	 of	
type p	is	true	–	the	evidence	at	our	disposal	–	it	is	not	at	all	remote	(Williams	
2004a:	471).
With	 this	 in	mind,	Williams	concludes	 that	explanations based  on  the  idea  
of	“factual	remoteness”	do	not	hit	the	crux	of	the	sceptical	problem,	so	that	
conversational	 contextualists	 fail	 to	 provide	 an	 adequate	 diagnosis	 of	 the	
sceptical	 problem.	This	 insight	 leads	Williams	 to	 a	 diagnosis	 of	Cartesian	
scepticism	based	on	the	so-called	“Underdetermination problem”	(Brueckner	
1994).	Since	the	sceptic	conceives	worlds	in	which	our	perceptual	evidence	










classification	 of beliefs	 into	epistemological	kinds	 to an attempt to provide 
evidential	justification	 for	all	our	empirical	knowledge	(so-called	The Prior 
Grounding Requirement,	cf.	Williams	2001:	24).	To	critically	examine	“The	
Prior	 Grounding	 Requirement”,	 Williams	 proposed	 his	 “theoretical	 diag-
nosis”	 of	 traditional	 epistemological	 inquiry,	 aiming	 to	 identify	 its	 hidden	





when	one	belief	 is	 for	us	based	on	another,	 in	such	a	way	that	 the	 latter	 is	
serving	as	our	evidence	for	the	former”	(2017:	244;	cf.	DeRose	2017:	247)	








that	 idea,	as	DeRose	observes,	appeals	 to	“the	old	 ‘No	a	priori	knowledge	
of	deeply	contingent	truths’	mantra”	(DeRose	2017:	250)	which	is,	as	he	is	
inclined	to	think,	false	and	should	be	abandoned.
















points out one important direction in which the sceptical problem could be 
understood. 
Given	the	assumption	of	epistemological	realism,	Williams	notices	that	the	




mean raising the standards for knowledge,	but	entirely	rests	on	conducting	
a	different	type	of	investigation	motivated	by	the	traditional	epistemological	
question	of	 a	 special	 subject-matter:	 the	possibility	of	knowledge	as  such  
(Williams	2004a:	462).	The	transformation	from	an	everyday	to	a	sceptical	
context	cannot,	Williams	believes,	simply	be	tantamount	to	lifting	the	lev-
8	   
But	 it	 is	 a	question	of	 its	own	whether	 con-
versational	contextualism	can	account	for	the	
complete	answer	to	the	problem	of	traditional	
skepticism  or  not.  To  address  the  prevailing  
critics	 that	contextualist	 theory	 is	flawed	 be-
cause it is committed to (i) the highly contro-
versial	claim	such	as	“Now	you	know	it	now	
you	don’t.”	(see:	Yourgrau	1983:	183;	Stanley	
2005:	 52);	 (ii)  the  view  that  epistemologists  
are  best  described  as  the  most  ignorant  per-
sons	 in	 the	 world	 (Engel	 2004:	 210;	 Feld-
man	 2001:	 62;	 etc.);	 and	 (iii)  the  view  that  
knowledge  that  radical  sceptical  hypotheses  
are	false	cannot	be	truthfully	stated	or	that	it	is	
unspeakable	(Davis	2004:	260;	Schiffer	1996:	
321),	 DeRose	 and	 Cohen	 have	 claimed	 that	
the	aforementioned	objections	are	the	result	of	
a	mischaracterisation	of	their	position,	which	
is correctly understood as a meta-linguistic or 
semantic	 theory	 of	 knowledge	 attributions.	
And this is exactly the point where criticism  
 







tic  challenges  our  intuition  that  we  do  have  
knowledge	 –	 an	 intuition	 that	we	 express	 in	
object	 language;	 they	 note	 that	 the	 answer	
to	it	must	be	at	the	same	level.	But,	as	some	
authors	 have	 observed,	 if	 such	 an	 answer	 is	




























proper	question	 to	 ask	 is:	what	happens	with	 the	 epistemic	 standards	 after	
such	moments?	Are	they	raising	the	level of	scrutiny	or	changing	the	angle 
of	scrutiny?	
In	§1,	we	saw	that	 in	maintaining	 the	raising the standards	 thesis,	conver-
sational  contextualists  commit  themselves  to  the  notion  that  the  pattern  by  
which	 the	 sceptic	 formulates	 their	 arguments	does	not	depart	 from	 that	by	















irrelevant in particular contexts is not that they have not been introduced into 
a	conversation	(conversational	contextualists)	or	for	practical	reasons	(Foge-
lin),	but	a	fundamental	fact	about	the	logic of inquiry. For one argument in 
support	of	this	claim,	Williams	provides	the	observation	that	methodological	
necessities	 –	 although	 they	 allow	 an	 inexhaustible	 increase	 in	 the	 level	 of	
scrutiny	within	their	native	context	–	by	determining	the	reasonableness	of	
any	challenge	to	our	knowledge	claims	they	preclude	the	possibility	of	con-








us	distant	 from	considering	 sceptical	possibilities	 as	 epistemically	 relevant	
(i.e.,	as	defeaters)	to	our	knowledge	claim,	even	in	a	context	in	which	we	are	
very	close	to	considering	them.	Imagine	Hana	researching	the	“History	of	the	
philosophical	 idea	of	 scepticism”.	 Imagine	 that	despite	Hana’s	keen	effort,	
the	professor	denies	her	the	highest	mark,	claiming	that	Hana’s	evidence	is	
insufficient	 to	support	her	conclusion	since	she	has	failed	to	consider	argu-
ments	in	Michael	de	Montaigne’s	writings,	Francisco	Sánchez, etc. It becomes 
clear	 how	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 raise	 the	 “level	 of	 scrutiny”	 very	 high,	without	
even	 coming	 close	 to	 considering	 sceptical	 hypotheses	 as	 “defeaters”	 to	 a	
given	knowledge	claims.	We	can	also	imagine	that	the	professor	commends	
Hana	for	providing	evidence	on	the	first	modern	versions	of	the	Evil	Deceiver	
hypothesis. It becomes clear that sceptical possibilities can be brought to at-
tention	without	our	tendency	to	intensively	reflect	on	them	and	feel	obliged	to	
consider them as epistemically relevant challenges to our ordinary knowledge 
claims.	Viewed	in	this	light,	it	seems	obvious	that	as	long	as	Hana	is	dealing	
with	scepticism	from	one	angle	of	scrutiny	–	the angle of historical research 
– it	will	be	obvious	that,	say,	scepticism	had	a	profound	influence	on	the	de-
velopment	of	intellectual	thought	in	the	16th	century,	or	that	the	earth	existed	
5	minutes	ago.	These	 insights	 suggest	 that	 the	“angle	of	 scrutiny”	exclude	
























9   
“What	 we	 are	 looking	 into	 is	 a	 function	 of	
what	we	are	 leaving	alone.	We	can	no	more	























mechanisms	 for	 the	 shifting	 of	 standards	 are	 conceived	with	 the	 intent	 of	













scepticism”	 (Stroud	2000:	 7)	 since	 “epistemological	 realism”	 is	 not	 an	 as-
sumption	but	a	by-product	of	sceptical	reasoning.	On	Stroud’s	account,	the	
doctrine	of	epistemological priority	of	beliefs	concerning	immediate	experi-
ence is supported by the mere common-sense opinion that all our knowledge 
of	physical	 objects	 comes	 through	experience.	Since	we	need	 to	 say	more	
about	 sense-perception	 and	 its	 function	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 empirical	
knowledge,	Stroud	believed	 that	 the	sceptic’s	questioning	does	not	 lie	 in	a	
















around us on the basis of sense-perception”.	However,	we	might	wonder	if	
in	accepting	the	(natural	and	highly	intuitive)	idea	that	experience	plays	an	




sense-perception	does	not	play	a	foundational,	but	causal-explanatory role in 
















losophers.10	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 supposing	 that	 Stroud	 is	 right	 –	 i.e.	 to	 let	
sceptical	questioning	pass	off	as	merely	intuitive	and	natural	–	we	would	be	
open	to	criticism	(that	we	have	just	hinted	above)	directed	at	conversational	






In	this	paper,	we	have	argued	in	favour	of	the	account	of	changing the angle 




ing	 this	 debate	provide	only	 a	 starting	point	 for	 further	 research,	 the	most	
important	of	which	concerns	the	question:	by	which	linguistic	means	can	we	
justify	the	claim	that	epistemic	standards	are	context-sensitive?	But,	provid-
ing an answer to this question is a highly demanding task beyond the scope 
of	this	paper.
10	   
In	so	doing,	we	also	come	through	clarifying	
what	Williams	means	 by	 stating	 that,	 in	 the	
right	frame	of	mind,	one	has	a	peculiar	inter-
est in sceptical arguments.
11   
Nowadays,	there	is	a	striking	tendency	among	
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Cilj je rada istražiti dva različita razmatranja mehanizama putem kojim se mijenjanju episte-
mički standardi, kao osnova za objašnjenje toga kako argumenti za radikalni skepticizam stječu 
svoje naličje legitimnosti i snage uvjerljivosti. Rasprava započinje predstavljanjem argumenata 
za pogled o tome da naša epistemička praksa sadrži mehanizam koji	podiže epistemičke stan-
darde, da bi se predočilo kako skeptičke hipoteze čine izazove istinosnim vrijednostima naših 
svakidašnjih tvrdnji iz znanja. Zatim se rasprava premješta na kritiku s ciljem pokazivanja da 
pristup podizanja	standarda nije adekvatan jer se ne dotiče doista radikalnog oblika filozofijskog 
skepticizma. Ispitujemo alternativno razmatranje promjene epistemičkih standarda, mijenjanje	
kuta	proučavanja, u skladu s kojim su epistemički standardi tumačeni kao uvjetovani discipli-
narnim poljem unutar kojeg se istraživanje provodi. Nakon toga, uspoređujemo dva istaknuta 
pristupa na osnovi njihove uspješnosti u osiguravanju odgovarajućeg objašnjenja stvarne epi-
stemičke prakse. Završavamo dokazivanjem u korist potonjeg pristupa, kao superiornije kon-
cepcije te kao obećavajućeg okvira za objašnjenje fenomenologije naše uključenosti u filozofij-




Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?
Zusammenfassung
Die Intention des Papers ist es, zwei unterschiedliche Erwägungen zu den Mechanismen zu 
untersuchen, durch die sich epistemische Standards ändern, als Basis für die Erklärung, wie die 
Argumente für den radikalen Skeptizismus ihre Merkmale der Legitimität und Überzeugungs-
kraft annehmen. Die Erörterung setzt ein mit der Präsentation der Argumente für den Stand-
punkt, dass unsere epistemische Praxis einen Mechanismus in sich birgt, der den epistemischen 
Standard anhebt, um darzustellen, wie skeptische Hypothesen die wahren Werte unserer alltäg-
lichen wissensbasierten Behauptungen herausfordern. Anschließend verlegt sich die Diskussion 
auf die Kritik, mit dem Ziel, zu zeigen, dass der Ansatz der Anhebung von Standards nicht ange-
zeigt ist, weil er keine wahrhaftig radikale Form des philosophischen Skeptizismus berührt. Wir 
nehmen eine alternative Überlegung zur Änderung epistemischer Standards in Augenschein, 
nämlich die Änderung	des	Blickwinkels	der	Erforschung, wonach epistemische Standards als 
die durch den Disziplinarbereich bedingte Standards ausgelegt werden, innerhalb dessen die 
Erforschung durchgeführt  wird.  Danach vergleichen wir  die  beiden herausragenden Ansätze  
auf der Grundlage ihrer Effizienz bei der Bereitstellung einer adäquaten Erklärung der tatsäch-
lichen epistemischen Praxis. Wir schließen ab mit der Beweisführung zugunsten des letzteren 
Ansatzes als überlegene Konzeption und als vielversprechender Rahmen für die Erklärung der 
Phänomenologie unserer Beteiligung an dem philosophischen Skeptizismus. Zum Schluss wer-








Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle
Résumé
L’objectif de ce travail est de rechercher deux différentes manières de considérer les mécanismes 
à travers lesquels les standards épistémiques se modifient en tant que fondements pour expliquer 
comment les arguments en faveur du scepticisme radical acquièrent un semblant de légitimité 
et leur pouvoir de persuasion. La discussion prend pour point de départ la présentation d’argu-
ments, permettant d’observer que notre pratique épistémique contient un mécanisme qui élève 
le standard épistémique, afin d’illustrer la manière dont les hypothèses sceptiques constituent 
un défi pour les valeurs de vérité de nos affirmations quotidiennes issues des sciences. Ensuite, 
la discussion prend la forme d’une critique dans le but de montrer que l’approche qui vise à 
élever le standard n’est pas adéquate puisqu’elle ne touche pas réellement à la forme radicale 
du scepticisme philosophique. Nous interrogeons les considérations alternatives du changement 
des standards épistémiques, le changement d’angle d’étude, en accord avec l’interprétation des 
standards épistémiques en tant que conditionnés par le champ disciplinaire au sein duquel la 
recherche se déroule. Après cela, nous comparons deux approches importantes sur la base de 
leur  succès  dans la  garantie  d’une explication appropriée de la  réelle  pratique épistémique.  
Nous terminons par démontrer les avantages de cette dernière approche, en tant que conception 
supérieure et cadre prometteur pour expliquer la phénoménologie de notre implication dans le 
scepticisme philosophique. En conclusion, nous questionnons les deux approches.
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